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Abstract 
Nudges, one of the rapidly growing law-making and public policy tools, are 
considered by their proponents to have a generally neutral effect on autonomy. Our 
study is the first to test nudges under the prism of Self-Determination Theory, a 
motivational theory which posits that autonomy is a basic psychological need. We 
focus on a specific type of nudge, defaults, and test it within the context of making a 
choice among a hypothetical set of insurance programs for post-graduate students. 
Results show that the experience of an Internal Perceived Locus of Causality (I-
PLOC) is negatively affected by defaults when the number of options is low but there 
is no effect when it is high. In other words, people are less likely to view themselves 
as the origin of their choices when defaults are in place and when options are 
manageable. The experience of an I-PLOC has a positive effect on self-regulation and 
vitality, partially mediated by perceived competence. We suggest that since even mild 
manipulations show an undermining effect on autonomy, the so-called ‘libertarian 
paternalistic’ interventions should be evaluated on the basis of their effect on basic 
need satisfaction, self-regulation and vitality, all of which are associated with 
autonomy according to Self-Determination Theory.   
Keywords: self-determination theory, nudges, libertarian paternalism, autonomy, self-
authorship. 
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Are defaults supportive of autonomy? An examination of nudges under the lens of 
Self-Determination Theory 
Nudging is a rapidly growing law-making and public policy tool that is 
utilized by many governments around the world (Reisch, Sunstein, & Gwozdz, 2017). 
Nudges are interventions that “steer people in particular directions but that also allow 
them to go their own way” (Sunstein, 2015a, p. 417). Pre-selected options, better 
known as defaults, provide a familiar example: in many countries, being an organ 
donor or being enrolled in a health insurance or pension scheme is the default choice 
(made by the government or one’s employer) but individuals retain the ability to ‘opt-
out’, that is, request that they be removed from the list of organ donors or the relevant 
schemes.  
To count as a nudge, the intervention must be easy to avoid and, therefore, 
several traditional methods of legal intervention, such as fines, imprisonment, 
subsidies and taxation, are ruled out. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) claim that a subtle 
arrangement of people’s choices, which they named “choice architecture” can steer 
them towards good choices while still allowing them to choose differently. This 
includes good choices for themselves, a scheme that is now widely discussed under 
the somewhat oxymoronic label libertarian paternalism. Libertarian paternalism 
promises “to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged 
by themselves” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 5). 
Nudges receive considerable criticism on different grounds. For example, 
nudges may not result in choices that are consistent with the nudgees’ preferences 
(Bovens, 2009; Nagatsu, 2015). They do not only target the welfare of the nudgee but 
are also beneficial for other people, thereby classifying them not only as a paternalist 
but also as a political tool that should be evaluated as such (Clavien, 2018; Guala & 
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Mittone, 2015). Their legitimacy is also questioned on the basis of criteria concerning 
both their means and their ends (Engelen, 2019). Perhaps the most important 
objection to nudges is that they undermine people’s autonomy, even though their 
liberty remains generally unaffected (Bovens, 2009; Hausman & Welch, 2010; 
Nagatsu, 2015). Objections of course relate to the issue of how autonomy is defined. 
The different definitions employed in the relevant literature can be classified under 
three categories: freedom of choice, agency and self-constitution (Vugts, Van Den 
Hoven, De Vet, & Verweij, 2018). Therefore, the issue of autonomy can be 
approached under different, meaningful perspectives.  
 Within this wide debate on the impact of nudges on autonomy, we will focus 
on an empirical question: Do nudges actually allow people to go their own way? In 
order to answer this question, we have to be able to measure whether the way people 
are headed is actually their own, after they have been nudged. As in every other case 
of seemingly libertarian policies that claim to allow individuals to go their own way, 
we need to take the viewpoint of the individuals themselves in order to fully evaluate 
nudges (Arvanitis & Kalliris, 2017). This entails adopting a psychological 
perspective, within which we will operationalize the aspects of autonomy that were 
mentioned above. Proper evaluation of nudges generally requires more evidence in 
order to examine the claim that they are evidence-based (Grüne-Yanoff, 2016). In this 
endeavor we will rely on Self-Determination Theory (SDT), a motivational theory 
that has been built “brick by brick” on the basis of empirical research (Ryan & Deci, 
2019).     
A psychological-motivational perspective on nudges 
A psychological perspective is different to the behavioral economics’ 
perspective from which the study of nudges has emerged. Although, in some ways, 
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behavioral economics developed when psychology found its way into economics 
(exemplified by the Nobel Prize that was awarded to the psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman in 2002), it has held onto the concept of preferences in order to approach 
human behavior (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010). Indeed, nudges are based on the 
recognition that people systematically deviate from a preference-satisfying behavior 
and are used in order to bring them on the right track. On the other hand, psychology 
is not bound by the concept of preferences. Self-Determination Theory in particular 
does not have a view of autonomy as a state in which people act according to 
preferences. People could act according to their preferences and equally be 
autonomous or non-autonomous depending on the type of motivation. For example, 
they may consistently prefer to perform behavior that produces an external reward 
than maintain internal values. This is not considered autonomous behavior according 
to SDT.   
Self-Determination Theory asserts that at the core of the self there is an 
organismic inherent growth potential and an innate tendency for integration of 
structures, functions and experiences. In other words, individuals have a tendency to 
grow and incorporate aspects of their life into their selves. Once behavior is regulated 
by the self, rather than external structures or forces, it is regulated autonomously. It 
builds on the organism’s talents and abilities and results in higher cognitive 
performance (e.g., Ryan, Connell, & Plant, 1990), creativity (e.g., Koestner, Ryan, 
Bernieri, & Holt, 1984), vitality, that is, having mental and physical energy (Ryan & 
Deci, 2008), and well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000).    
 The development of SDT started from the work of Deci (1971), who was 
interested in examining the effect of rewards on intrinsically motivated activities. 
These are activities that the person pursues autonomously, without receiving any 
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rewards other than the activity itself. Deci (1971) found that rewards undermine 
intrinsic motivation and proposed, on the basis of a distinction made by De Charms 
(1968), that the effect was due to a shift in the feeling of personal causation: the 
participants shifted from having an Internal Perceived Locus of Causality (I-PLOC), 
that is, perceiving themselves as origins of their behavior, to having an External 
Perceived Locus of Causality (E-PLOC), that is, perceiving themselves as ‘pawns’ to 
external rewards.  
Since the initial studies of Deci (1971), a rich body of research has shown that 
having an I-PLOC has positive effect on a wealth of aspects of human life, such as 
achievement and prosocial behavior (e.g., Ryan & Connell, 1989), physical activity 
(e.g., Chatzisarantis, Hagger, Biddle, Smith, & Wang, 2003), organizations (e.g., 
Gagne & Deci, 2014), education (e.g., Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Ryan, 1991), and 
health (e.g., Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996). Ryan & Connell 
(1989) created the first model of PLOC that has been enriched and tested and 
continues to be empirically supported (e.g., Sheldon, Osin, Gordeeva, Suchkov, & 
Sychev, 2017). Six types of regulation have now been proposed and empirically tested 
with regard to a wealth of activities: amotivation, that is, lack of intentionality to act 
(impersonal PLOC), external regulation, which is based on external controls such as 
rewards or punishments (E-PLOC), introjected regulation, which is based on internal 
controls such as guilt or pride (somewhat E-PLOC), regulation through identification, 
where the person identifies with the personal value of behavior (somewhat I-PLOC), 
integrated regulation, where a person not only identifies with a behavior but also 
integrates that identification within other aspects of the self (I-PLOC), and intrinsic 
regulation, where an act is performed for the sake of the act itself, that is, out of 
interest or enjoyment (I-PLOC). The latter three forms of regulation are considered 
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autonomous types of regulation and have been associated with a wealth of positive 
life outcomes (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008). Moreover, individuals have a natural 
propensity to transform external into internal regulations, a process called 
internalization, but this process largely depends on contextual factors (Deci, Eghrari, 
Patrick, & Leone, 1994). 
Within SDT, the concept of PLOC has proven useful in empirical work as an 
operationalization for the concept of autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2017). I-PLOC has 
both an experienced and a functional aspect. On the one hand, it is associated with 
having the experience of perceived choice, volition and I-PLOC and, on the other 
hand, it is connected to deeper functions of organismic integration. In this sense, apart 
from its phenomenological property, the I-PLOC also has a functional role that relates 
to the types of regulation mentioned above, as well as the positive functional 
outcomes that are associated with them.  Autonomy -and the I-PLOC- can be 
conceptualized both through its phenomenological property (the self-as-me) as well as 
through its deeper functional properties (the self-as-process; for a fuller discussion see 
Ryan & Deci, 2017).  
It is important, for our purposes, to note the practical connection of the I-
PLOC to autonomy within SDT. On the one hand, autonomy is the theoretical concept 
that refers to the sense that one’s actions emanate from oneself and has empirically 
been shown to be undermined under the presence of contextual factors such as 
rewards, threats, deadlines, surveillance (Deci & Ryan, 1987). Research has also 
shown that it is essential for psychological growth, integrity and well-being and 
therefore qualifies as a need (Deci & Ryan, 2000). On the other hand, the I-PLOC 
operationalizes the theoretical concept of autonomy in empirical research.  
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The support of autonomous regulation is essentially the support of the 
organism’s integrative and growth potential. Years of research show that this is 
possible by providing support not only for the need for autonomy but for all three 
basic psychological needs, namely the needs for autonomy, competence and 
relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Autonomy is the need to self-regulate, competence 
is the need to achieve mastery and relatedness is the need to connect to others. The 
needs do not necessarily each have an isolated functional effect on the human 
organism but there also appear to be synergistic effects. For example, Dysvik, 
Kuvaas, & Gagné (2013) found that competence support has a positive effect on work 
motivation only if autonomy is supported at the same time. Sierens, Vansteenkiste, 
Goossens, Soenens, & Dochy (2009) found that competence support interacts with 
autonomy support in order to produce a positive effect on self-regulated learning. 
Deci, La Guardia, Moller, Scheiner, & Ryan (2006) showed how autonomy and 
relatedness complement each other in producing fulfilling relationships. Therefore, in 
order to facilitate autonomous regulation, the environment must often go beyond 
simply providing nutriments for autonomy toward providing support for relatedness 
and competence as well. 
Options and autonomy 
In order for people to be able to go their own way, there should be enough ‘ways’ to 
choose from, that is, enough options. There is an intuitive appeal to the idea that 
having more options are, other things being equal, preferable to having less options, 
which seems to be no more than a rule of thumb or an ‘empirical generalization in 
philosophical discussions’ (Dworkin, 1982).  This view is closely linked to the idea 
that autonomy as self-rule is, at least in part, an exercise concept: enjoying an 
adequate range of options allows us to make life-shaping choices, provided that other 
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factors do not restrict our autonomy (Raz, 1986; for a relevant discussion also see 
Kalliris, 2017). However, there also seems to be considerable appeal in the view that 
having to make too many choices can be overwhelming, undesirable and ultimately 
damaging to personal well-being (Schwartz, 2000). Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice (1998) suggest that making choices could generally result in ego-
depletion, that is, a temporary state for reduced willingness to engage in voluntary 
action caused by a prior exercise of choice, although this is more probable when the 
prior choice was controlled, rather than autonomous (Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006). 
When such choices are indeed controlled, meaning that people feel compelled to 
make them, and individuals would rather not make those decisions themselves 
(because they are, for example, too complicated or otherwise burdensome), they may 
prefer them to be made for them by someone else. Then both their autonomy and 
well-being would be benefited because they would save valuable time that they could 
spend on other issues (Shah, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2012). Some nudges appear to 
qualify as ‘pre-made decisions’ of this kind and defaults are perhaps the most obvious 
example of such a decision on the part of the government. In his discussion of 
defaults, Sunstein (2014) defends this particular type of nudging by relying, among 
other arguments, on a similar point regarding defaults and autonomous decision-
making. He argues that active choosing increases the cost of decision-making by 
imposing large and unwelcome burdens to choosers, such as choosing every simple 
feature of their internet connection plan or any other scheme or setting that is too 
technical or complicated. Defaults can relieve individuals of this burden and, 
furthermore, reduce the risk of error. Again, when active choosing becomes too 
technical or overwhelming, people would be better off in terms of both autonomy and 
well-being by relying on the default option, assuming that the choice architect who 
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sets the default has the necessary expertise and does not produce policies that simply 
reflect her own choices (Ambuehl, Bernheim & Ockenfels, 2019; Beraldo, 2017). 
Health insurance and pension schemes can illustrate the point: in theory, many 
individuals would be frustrated by the volume of the work required to choose the plan 
that best works for them among an overwhelming number of highly technical options 
and it may make sense to assume that they would not consider their autonomy 
restricted by a preselected default.      
Scope of the study  
The study aims to explore the effects of default nudges on autonomy, as 
conceptualized through the SDT framework, in the context of health insurance 
schemes. For the purposes of this study the imposition of a nudge will be as mild as 
pressing a button on the remote control to change the television station after a popular 
program. Even with very low switching costs, people will tend to stay on the same 
television channel after the end of a popular television program, thereby illustrating 
the power of defaults (Esteves-Sorenson & Perretti, 2012). We chose a mild 
manipulation, with similar switching costs, in order to explore the minimum effects of 
defaults on autonomy.  At the same time, we wanted to test the effect of the number 
of options. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, defaults may be welcome when a 
choice becomes burdensome due to an unmanageable number of options. We 
therefore expected that undermining effects of defaults on autonomy would be present 
only with a manageable number of options, compared to a large number of options in 
which the default would have no effect. In other words, we expected that a default 
will have negative impact when options are manageable. We also expected that our 
mild manipulation would only have an immediate effect on the proximal aspect of 
experienced autonomy, and more particularly the experienced I-PLOC, whereas any 
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effects on distal functional aspects would be partially mediated by the fulfillment of 
the need for competence (on the basis of the synergistic effects of the basic 
psychological needs). 
Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and thirty-nine undergraduate psychology students from the University 
of Crete participated in this study. Of these 87.1% were women and the mean age was 
20.46 (SD = 3.54). The experiment was based on a 2 (Default: Yes, No) x 2 (No. of 
options: 3,9) between-subjects design.  
Procedure and materials 
Participants responded voluntarily to a research announcement made by one of the 
authors at the end of university lectures. They were informed that the study involved 
the selection of health insurance programs and gave written informed consent, in line 
with the World Medical Association's declaration of Helsinki. Due to the nature of the 
task, we anticipated minimal emotional involvement on the part of participants. 
Deception was kept to a minimum and involved the true purpose of the study as well 
as its experimental design, since the study was presented as a European Union survey 
on possible future health insurance programs. After completion, participants were 
thoroughly debriefed on the exact nature of the study, were probed for suspicion, and 
were excused. 
 The materials started with a one-page description of the study, explaining that 
the number of post-graduate students around Europe has increased and that the 
European Union has decided to pilot-test a subsidized health insurance program that 
requires 10% of the total cost to be covered by the students themselves. Participants 
were asked to evaluate these programs. The description of the study also introduced 
NUDGES AND AUTONOMY SUPPORT                                                                 12 
 
 
the two manipulations. In terms of the Number of options, students were either told 
that the study involved the pilot-testing of three insurance programs or they were told 
that it involved the pilot-testing of nine insurance programs. The programs were then 
presented in a brief table. In terms of the Default, students were either told in one 
short paragraph that the European Union had pre-selected a specific program (the 
selection was denoted by a tick next to the label of the program) or they were told 
nothing (and the programs had no tick next to their labels). 
 The participants were then given a short description of the categories that were 
necessary to evaluate the health insurance programs. The categories were 13 in total, 
and referred to coverage of treatment within the country and abroad, check-ups, 
surgery, doctor fees, exclusive nurse, room classes, surgical allowance etc. After 
being familiarized with the basic properties of health insurance programs, participants 
were presented with the specifics of each program. There were many variations in 
aspects of the programs, including their price, which varied from 130 to 170 Euros per 
year. 
A table of the health insurance programs was subsequently given to the 
participants (either three or nine programs, depending on condition) and they were 
called on to indicate the insurance program of their choice by writing an ‘X’ next to it. 
If the participants were in the Default condition, the pre-selected program had already 
a tick next to it. If they agreed with the default, they were requested to leave it that 
way. If they disagreed with the default, they were requested to write an ‘X’ next to the 
program of their choice. 
 Finally, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire with the following 
scales: a twelve-item, constructed for the purposes of this study, Experienced 
Autonomy Scale (similar to Reeve, Nix & Ham, 2003) with the subscales perceived 
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choice (with items such as “I believe I had little choice in selecting an insurance 
program”; α = .69) volition (“I feel relaxed by the selection of the insurance 
program”; α = .81)  and locus of causality (“I feel the selection I made is a product of 
my own thoughts”; α = .84), the Subjective Vitality Scale (SVS; Ryan & Frederick, 
1997; α = .84), the Situational Motivation Scale (SIMS; Guay, Vallerand & 
Blanchard, 2000; amotivation α = .85, external regulation α = .76, identified 
regulation α = .74, intrinsic regulation α = .87), and the Perceived Competence Scale 
(adapted from Williams & Deci, 1996; α = .90). The Perceived Competence Scale 
was used as a measure of fulfillment of the need for competence, while SVS, as a 
measure of physical and mental energy, and SIMS, as a measure of self-regulation, 
were employed as measures for the functional aspect of autonomy. Α 7-point scale 
(1=not true, 4=somewhat true, 7=completely true) was used for all items. 
Results 
Effect of Default on participant choice of insurance program 
For our mild manipulation to have an effect on choice, we expected that participants 
would tend to choose the default option when they were presented with one. Indeed, 
40/69 = 58% of participants chose the exact same option in the default condition, 
while 27/70 = 38,6% of participants chose the default option in the no-default 
condition, χ2(1) = 5.238, p = .022. Therefore, our manipulation worked as expected. 
Effect of Default and No. of options on locus of causality 
We performed a 2 (Default: Yes, No) x 2 (No. of options: 3,9) ANOVA with locus of 
causality as our dependent variable (see Figure 2). We found a main effect of Default, 
F(1,134) = 8.024, p = .005, ηp2 = .056, with participants reporting higher internal 
locus of causality in the no-default condition (M = 5.84, SD = .99) than the default 
condition (M = 5.27, SD = 1.39). This effect was qualified by a significant Default x 
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No. of options interaction, F(1,134) = 7.039, p = .009, ηp2 = .05. Simple main effects 
analysis showed that in the condition of 3 programs, locus of causality was higher in 
the no-default condition (M = 6.16, SD = .83) than in the default condition (M = 5.06, 
SD = 1.42, F(1,134) = 15.047, p < .001). There was no statistical significant 
difference in the condition of the 9 programs, F(1,134) = .016, ns. 
 Moreover, within the default condition, participants that did not choose the 
default option had higher internal locus of causality (M = 5.88, SD = 1.21) than the 
participants that did choose the default option (M = 4.83, SD = 1.35, t(67) = 3.344, p 
= .001). 
Last, we performed 2-way ANOVAs on perceived choice, volition, perceived 
competence, vitality and Situational Relative Autonomy Index (SRAI, calculated 
from the SIMS as follows: 2*intrinsic motivation + identified regulation − external 
regulation – 2*amotivation, cf. Grolnick & Ryan, 1997). No main effects or 
interactions were significant. 
Locus of causality and functional aspects of autonomy 
In order to determine the ways in which experienced aspects of autonomy and, more 
specifically, the experienced aspect of the I-PLOC predicts functional aspects of 
autonomy (i.e., self-regulation, measured by SRAI, and vitality, measured by SVS), 
we performed a path analysis (see Figure 2). We predicted that the experienced I-
PLOC would positively predict self-regulation and, through it, vitality but the effect 
would be partially mediated by perceived competence. This was expected on the basis 
of the synergistic effects of the basic psychological needs and their functional 
significance. The fit of the model was very good, χ2(1) = .134, p = .714, RMSEA < 
.001, SRMR = .0085, GFI = 1, NFI = .998. As expected, the effect of the experienced 
locus of causality on SRAI was partly mediated by perceived competence and the 
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effect on vitality was mediated by both SRAI and perceived competence. Indirect 
effects are reported in Table 1. 
Discussion 
Defaults are often described by their proponents as having a neutral effect on 
autonomy because they do not exclude any options for the chooser. Our study, the 
first that approaches nudges under the prism of Self-Determination Theory (SDT), 
shows that even a mild default will result in a less internal PLOC (in terms of its 
experienced aspect) when participants are called to choose among a manageable set of 
options. What counts as manageable would of course vary with the type and the 
particulars of every choice. In our study, the choice involved a rather distant and 
hypothetical insurance program and we, therefore, expected participants to have a low 
threshold for the number of options they would willingly engage in. Only when the 
constructed insurance program involved the manageable number of three options did 
the default have an undermining effect on autonomy. 
 Our mild manipulation had no effect on other experienced aspects of 
autonomy such as perceived choice and volition or functional aspects of autonomy 
such as self-regulation or vitality. This might be taken to mean that mild defaults 
cause a minor, even negligible, negative effect on autonomy, that is an effect that 
would be closer to the picture drawn by nudge theorists. However, on the basis of our 
path analysis, participants’ experience of an internal perceived locus of causality does 
seem to have positive effect on self-regulation and vitality, partially mediated by 
perceived competence.  This mechanism of support of autonomy for competence (for 
more, see Ryan & Moller, 2016) accounts more fully for the kind of need-supportive 
process that is necessary for the promotion of autonomous types of regulation and the 
achievement of higher vitality. In this sense, a supportive environment is an 
NUDGES AND AUTONOMY SUPPORT                                                                 16 
 
 
environment that provides nutrients for all needs. In the context of our experimental 
setting and in terms of autonomy support, the absence of defaults and the grouping of 
options so that they appear manageable might be required. However, it would not 
suffice. In terms of competence support, differing levels of options (e.g., the chance to 
choose among either three or nine insurance programs or the opportunity to elaborate 
on the initial three programs or, even, the prospect of receiving differing amounts of 
information) would offer the appropriate level of challenge for each citizen and the 
structure necessary for the satisfaction of the need for competence. After all, the 
selection of a –paternalistic– intervention does not necessarily have to be between 
allowing a chaotic choice with an unmanageable number of options on the one hand 
and imposing a default on the other. An arrangement of choices, in the spirit of a 
slightly different choice architecture, that aims to ‘manage’ a large number of options 
and, perhaps, categorize them conveniently is perfectly conceivable. 
 The effort to find remedies for need-thwarting effects of nudges may expand 
to include remedies for more traditional paternalistic interventions. If mild nudges do, 
in fact, under specific circumstances, have a negative impact on aspects of autonomy, 
it is worth asking how negative an impact a more traditional paternalistic intervention, 
such as small fines, may have. Traditional legal paternalism of course does not 
emerge as a natural candidate for facilitating self-regulation. Sometimes it even takes 
the form of a legal statute that makes the self-harmful conduct in question a criminal 
offense. When this offense is punishable by imprisonment (as it is often the case with 
the use of drugs and other illegal substances), the effect on autonomy is devastating. 
However, when the paternalistic law punishes the self-harmful conduct by means, for 
example, of a small fine, the relevance of this discussion becomes obvious. The 
question that follows naturally concerns the conditions under which a small fine will 
NUDGES AND AUTONOMY SUPPORT                                                                 17 
 
 
support autonomy. One possibility is that mild punishment will have minimum 
negative impact on autonomy if it is accompanied by a strong informational 
component, in line with the position that rewards which are informational do not have 
adverse effects on autonomous motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999).  
 According to SDT, all external events have two functional aspects: a 
controlling and an informational aspect. The controlling aspect facilitates an E-PLOC 
whereas the informational aspect facilitates an I-PLOC (Ryan, 1982). The impact of 
any external event on autonomy is dependent upon which of the two aspects becomes 
salient. Traditional paternalism gives prominence to rewards and punishments and 
therefore emphasizes controlling aspects. Bringing out an informational aspect will 
inevitably pose a challenge. However, the same challenge must be met by libertarian 
paternalism. A default, for example, may carry with it the information that it is 
endorsed by an expert (Sunstein, 2013). On the other hand, it has also been argued 
that nudges work best in the dark (Bovens, 2009), in the sense that being transparent 
about a nudge’s purpose and function undermines its efficiency. A study casts doubt 
on this assumption, finding that being transparent about the purpose or potential 
influence of a default (or both) does not change the way people make decisions 
(Bruns, Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, Klement, Luistro Jonsson, & Rahali, 2018). This 
informational aspect of the influence of nudging on autonomy warrants further 
discussion (especially through the lens of SDT) just as it does in the case of traditional 
legal paternalism.1 If we adopt the SDT perspective, the main question for both 
approaches is how such information may provide autonomy support, facilitate 
integration, and result in higher vitality and well-being. These remarks challenge the 
                                                          
1 These points similarly apply to non-paternalistic interventions that may take the form of nudges or 
incentives. In this paper, we focus on paternalism because paternalistic ends make autonomy-restricting 
means more difficult to justify.  
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implied dichotomy between traditional legal paternalism and libertarian paternalism, 
in the sense that, firstly, nudges can undermine aspects of autonomy, as shown by the 
current study; and, secondly, traditional legal paternalism can impose minor 
restrictions of autonomy that are not necessarily more regrettable than those discussed 
in our study of nudges, especially if they are accompanied by adequate information 
that can be consciously processed and internalized.   
  Information seems to be crucial for internalization and, more importantly, for 
integration (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994). Informed people actively 
enacting their intrinsic tendencies is arguably the ideal form of self-authorship and the 
best way for people to choose what is best for them. Internalization of a behavior and, 
more so, its integration secures that people will choose what is best for them across 
situations and will produce lasting behavior change that will minimize the necessity 
for further paternalistic interventions. The motivational perspective of SDT can, 
therefore, help in the minimization of excessive nannying by the state (Le Grand, & 
New, 2015). Mols, Haslam, Jetten, & Steffens (2015) make a similar argument about 
the need for internalization, although they specifically refer to norm internalization 
and approach nudges from the scope of Social Identity Theory. From an SDT 
perspective, our study shows that defaults will shift PLOC outward when the number 
of options is low and should probably be avoided. In cases where the number of 
options is exceedingly high and need-supportive options are too expensive, defaults 
do emerge as an efficient and inexpensive way to help people to make the right choice 
for them, without a seemingly heavy further burden on autonomy. However, their 
evaluation should always be context-dependent and take into account the issues that 
have been addressed in this article. Sunstein (2015b) correctly points out that nudges 
should be evaluated in the proper context rather than as a mere abstraction. We agree 
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and feel that their evaluation should open up to include their effect on need 
satisfaction, self-regulation and vitality. The same applies for more traditional 
paternalistic interventions. 
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Table 1 
 
Indirect effects of locus of causality and perceived competence on functional aspects 
of autonomy 
   
Locus of causality SRAI  .086* 
Locus of causality Vitality  .120** 
Perceived competence  Vitality   .142***  
Note Scores indicate standardized indirect effects. 
* p < .05, **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUDGES AND AUTONOMY SUPPORT                                                                 28 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Locus of Causality as a function of Default and Number of Options 
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Figure 2 Standardized direct effects within a model of the functional aspect of 
autonomy 
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